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STATEMENT OF COURT'S JURISDICTION 
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B. SPECIFIC ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the Trial Court Err in Failing to Grant 
Plaintiffs Own Motion for Summary Judgment Since 
Plaintiff Submitted to the Bank a Proper Demand on 
a Letter of Credit, Which Demand was Never 
Withdrawn or Revoked, and Should Have Been 
Honored? 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Young, 
supra. 
Citation to Record Showing Issue Preserved. 
Record (,fR,f) 273-275, 287. 
II. Did the Trial Court Err in Finding that 
Plaintiff's Letters Instructing the Bank to Hold 
the Proceeds of the Letter of Credit Were 
Withdrawals of the Prior Demand for Payment of the 
Letter of Credit? 
Standard of Review: Correctness. 
Christiansen v. Holiday Rent-a-Car, 845 P.2d 
1316, 1319 (Utah App. 1992) cert, den. 853 
P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
Citation to Record Showing Issue Preserved. 
R-192-197, 269-271, 287. 
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III. Did the Trial Court Err in Finding that the 
Letter of Credit Expired Before Plaintiff Made 
Demand on That Letter? By Failing to Give Coyne 
Notice of Any Problem Until After the Letter of 
Credit Had Allegedly Expired, Is the Bank Estopped 
From Now Claiming Expiry? 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Texaco 
Inc. v. San Juan County, 869 P.2d 942, 949 
(Utah 1994) . 
Citation to Record Showing Issue Preserved. 
R-192-193, 271-273, 287. 
IV. Did the Trial Court Err by Not Finding that 
the Bank Failed to Comply with the Requirements of 
the UCP Which Were Part of the Letter of Credit? 
As a Result Is the Bank Estopped From Claiming 
Plaintiff May Not Recover Under the Letter of 
Credit? 
Standard of Review: Correctness. East 
Jordan Irrigation Company v. Morgan. 860 P.2d 
310, 312 (Utah 1993). 
Citation to Record Showing Issue Preserved. 
R-192-193, 271-273, 287. 
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V. Did the Trial Court Err in Refusing to Allow 
Plaintiff's Request for Oral Argument on the 
Summary Judgment Issue? 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Matter of 
Estate of Anderson. 821 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 
1991). 
Citation to Record Showing Issue Preserved. 
R-98# 277-278, 287. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS 
I. Utah Code Annotated, Section 70A-5-116(3): 
Except where the beneficiary has effectively 
assigned his right to draw or his right to proceeds, 
nothing in this section limits his right to transfer or 
negotiate drafts or demands drawn under the credit. 
II. Utah Code Annotated, Section 70A-9-306(l) 
"Proceeds11 includes whatever is received upon the 
sale, lease, exchange, collection or other disposition 
of collateral or proceeds. Insurance payable by reason 
of loss or damage to the collateral is proceeds, except 
to the extent that it is payable to a person other than 
a party to the security agreement. Money, checks, 
deposit accounts, and the like are "cash proceeds." 
All other proceeds are "noncash proceeds." 
III. Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-
501(3). 
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would 
dispose of the action or any issues in the action on 
the merits with prejudice, either party at the time of 
filing the principal memorandum in support of or in 
opposition to a motion may file a written request for a 
hearing. 
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(c) Such request shall be granted unless the 
court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to the 
motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue 
or set of issues governing the granting or denial of 
the motion has been authoritatively decided. 
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the 
court shall notify the requesting party. 
IV. Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary 
Credits (1983 Revision), International Chamber of 
Commerce Publication No. 400 ("UCP"), Article 16. 
(d) If the issuing bank decides to refuse the 
documents, it must give notice to that effect without 
delay by telecommunication or, if that is not possible, 
by other expeditious means, to the bank from which it 
received the documents (the remitting bank) or to the 
beneficiary, if it received the documents directly from 
him. Such notice must state the discrepancies in 
respect of which the issuing bank refuses the documents 
and must also state whether it is holding the documents 
at the disposal of, or is returning them to the 
presentor (remitting bank or beneficiary as the case 
may be). . . 
(e) If the issuing bank fails to act in 
accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (c) and 
(d) of this article and/or fails to hold the documents 
at the disposal of, or to return them to, the 
presentor, the issuing bank shall be precluded from 
claiming that the documents are not in accordance with 
the terms and conditions of the credit. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Coyne International Enterprises Corp., 
d/b/a Coyne Textile Services ("Coyne") brings this action against 
the Bank, asserting that the Bank should be ordered to honor and 
pay to Coyne the full proceeds of a certain letter of credit 
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("Letter of Credit") issued by the Bank in favor of Coyne in the 
sum of $33,000.00. Both Coyne and the Bank filed motions for 
summary judgment in the District Court proceeding. Coyne also 
filed a reguest for oral argument with respect to its motion for 
summary judgment. Coyne appeals from the Order of the District 
Court granting the Bank's motion for summary judgment and denying 
Coyne's motion for summary judgment and reguest for oral 
argument. 
The lower court order is dated July 17, 1995 and was 
signed by the Honorable Ray M. Harding, District Judge, of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of 
Utah. On August 16, 1995, Coyne timely filed its appeal from the 
District Court order. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. By a Lease Agreement dated August 1, 1983, Coyne 
had a leasehold interest in a Learjet 2 5D airplane, 
manufacturer's serial no. 3 62, United States registration no. 
N52CT (currently N717CW), together with two General Electric 
CJ610-8A engines, manufacturer serials nos. E-211300A and E-
211302A respectively. R-245. (The Learjet airplane and the 
motors are collectively referred to as the "Aircraft" throughout 
this appellant's brief). 
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2. On or about June 24, 1992, Coyne and Avstan, L.C., 
("Avstan"), a Utah limited liability company which is not a party 
to this action, entered into a Sublease Agreement ("Sublease"). 
In the Sublease Coyne, as lessee, agreed to sublease the Aircraft 
to Avstan, as sublessee. R-222-245. 
3. As part of the transaction involving the Sublease, 
on or about June 24, 1992, Stanley R. Pope, an individual 
("Pope"), and Stanco, Inc., a Utah corporation ("Stanco") signed 
and delivered a guaranty to Coyne, by which both Pope and Stanco 
guaranteed "full and prompt performance and payment of all 
obligations. . ." which Avstan owed to Coyne under the Sublease. 
R-218-219. 
4. Paragraph 4(c) of the Sublease provided that Avstan 
would provide an irrevocable letter of credit in the sum of 
$33,000 in favor of Coyne, which letter of credit would be 
security for Avstan's obligation to make rental payments under 
the Sublease. R-242. Bank was to issue the irrevocable letter 
of credit in favor of Coyne. Id. 
5. On or about June 23, 1992, Bank issued its 
Irrevocable Letter of Credit no. 005248 ("Letter of Credit") in 
favor of Coyne. R-91; Addendum "A." The Letter of Credit was 
payable to Coyne in its full face amount of $33,000 upon Bank's 
receipt of a written statement on Coyne's letterhead, signed by 
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an officer of Coyne, that Pope had " . . . not fulfilled the term 
of the contract . . . " relating to the Sublease. R-91, 216; 
Addendum "A." 
6. The Letter of Credit also contained the following 
language: 
This Credit is Subject to the Uniform Customs and 
Practice for Documentary Credits (1983 Revision). 
International Chamber of Commerce. Publication No. 
400. 
Id. (The language of the relevant portions of the UCP is 
contained on pages 4-5 of this brief. The full text of the 
Letter of Credit is contained in Addendum "A." 
7. By letter dated May 24, 1993, Coyne gave the Bank 
the written notice required by the Letter of Credit that Pope had 
defaulted on the terms of the contract relating to the Sublease. 
R-89, 103, 209; Addendum "B." The Letter of May 24, 1993 was 
written on Coyne's corporate letterhead and was prepared and 
signed by one of Coynes officers. Id. Through the testimony of 
one of its authorized officers, the Bank admits that the Letter 
of May 24, 1993 was a demand on the Letter of Credit. R-70, 95. 
8. The Bank never informed Coyne that the Letter of 
May 24, 1993 was not a sight draft or that the letter in any way 
failed to comply with the actual requirements for a presentation 
of demand required by the terms of the Letter of Credit. R-105-
106, 249. Neither did the Bank ever tell Coyne that either the 
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form or content of the demand contained in the Letter of May 24, 
1993 was in any way nonconforming, inadequate or defective- Id. 
9. On or about May 28, 1993, and four days after Coyne 
had made the May 24, 1993 demand on the Letter of Credit, Coyne's 
New York counsel wrote a letter to the Bank. In that Letter of 
May 28, 1993 Coyne's counsel informed the Bank: 
fT]he proceeds of the letter of credit are not to 
be paid as directed in Mr. Ryan's demand of May 25, 
1993 (sic)1 and that you should hold the proceeds until 
you receive further instructions from this office. 
R-79, 102, 214. Addendum "C" (emphasis added). 
10. The text of the Letter of May 28, 1995 simply 
instructed the Bank to "hold the proceeds" of the Letter of 
Credit on which Coyne had made earlier demand. The May 28, 1993 
Letter does not use words or terms such as "withdraw," "cancel" 
or "revoke" with respect to Coyne's earlier May 24, 1993 demand 
made on the Letter of Credit. Id. 
11. On or about June 1, 1993 one of Coyne's officers 
wrote the Bank and informed it: 
As is set forth in Mr. O'Hara's (Coyne's New York 
counsel) letter of May 28, 1993, you are authorized to 
hold the proceeds of the above referenced letter of 
Although Coyne's counsel writes that Coyne's demand letter is 
dated May 25, 1993, the actual correct date of Coyne's demand on 
the Letter of Credit is evident from the date the Letter of May 24, 
1993 bears. Coyne's counsel had written Pope a letter on May 25, 
1993 and appears to have incorrectly written that both his letter 
and Coyne's demand on the Letter of Credit were dated May 25, 1993. 
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credit until you receive further instructions from Mr. 
O'Hara. 
R-77, 101, 207; Addendum "D" (emphasis added). 
12. As was the case with the Letter of May 28, 1993, 
the Letter of June 1, 1993 simply informed the Bank to hold the 
Letter of Credit's proceeds until further instruction. Nothing 
in the Letter of June 1, 1993 uses the words "withdraw", "cancel" 
or "revoke" in reference to Coyne's earlier demand on the Letter 
of Credit. Id. 
13. At the time the Letters of May 28, 1993 and 
June 1, 1993 were written, Coyne believed that on account of its 
earlier demand on the Letter of Credit, the Bank had already 
reduced the Letter of Credit to proceeds. R-171, 172, 248. 
14. Coyne's Letters of May 28, 1993 and June 1, 1993 
were written because the Sublease provided for an arbitration 
proceeding in the event there were a dispute between Coyne, Pope, 
Stanco and/or Avstan. That arbitration proceeding was resolved 
in favor of Coyne. Shortly after the arbitration proceeding 
resolution, Coyne's counsel wrote the Bank on October 25, 1993 
and informed it: 
[W]e are now instructing you to forward the 
entire proceeds of the letter of credit in the amount 
of $33,000 to [Coyne's counsel]. 
R-72-73, 99-100, 211-212; Addendum "E" (emphasis added). 
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15. At no time between May 20, 1993 and October 25, 
1993 did the Bank ever inform Coyne in writing or otherwise that 
the Bank claimed either the Letter of May 28, 1993 or the Letter 
of June 1, 1993 revoked, rescinded, canceled or withdrew Coyne's 
earlier May 24, 1993 demand on the Letter of Credit. R-105-106, 
249-250. Nor did the Bank ever timely inform Coyne that the Bank 
claimed the Letter of Credit had expired without a proper demand 
having been made on the Letter of Credit. R-105-106, 249. 
16. At no time prior to the time Coyne filed its 
complaint did the Bank ever inform or otherwise notify Coyne that 
Zions had not reduced the Letter of Credit to proceeds or that 
the Bank would not hold the proceeds of the Letter of Credit as 
requested by Coyne. R-248. 
17. In the proceeding before the District Court, Coyne 
moved for summary judgment. R-98-99. Included in Coyne's motion 
for summary judgment was a request for oral argument. Id. After 
all memoranda had been filed, Coyne filed its notice to submit 
the summary judgment motions for decision. Included in that 
notice was a reference to Coyne's request for oral argument. R-
277-278. 
18. In the District Court's memorandum decision dated 
May 30, 1995, the Court simply held: "Plaintiff's Request for 
Oral Argument is denied." R-280; See also similar language in 
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the order. R-283. In neither the memorandum decision nor in the 
formal order implementing the memorandum decision did the 
District Court make any finding that Coyne's motion for summary 
judgment was frivolous or that the issues raised by Coyne in its 
motion for summary judgment had been previously and conclusively 
determined by a prior decision of a Utah court. R-279-281; 283. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT COYNE'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON COYNE'S TIMELY DEMAND ON THE 
LETTER OF CREDIT AND THE BANK'S FAILURE TO GIVE ANY NOTICE 
OF NONCOMPLIANCE. 
In matters involving an issuer of a letter of credit 
(i.e. Bank) and the beneficiary of the letter (i.e. Coyne), the 
issuer must simply look to the credit documents and not to the 
merits of the underlying transaction between its customer (i.e. 
Pope, Avstan and Stanco) and the beneficiary. Newvector 
Communications, Inc. v. Union Bank, 663 F.Supp 252, 255, 256 
(footnote 16)(D.C. Utah 1987) Utah Code, Section 70A-5-114(1). 
Coyne submitted a proper, conforming demand on the Letter of 
Credit. The demand contained in the Letter of May 24, 1993 was a 
sight draft. Coyne's demand on that letter was never withdrawn, 
revoked or rescinded. A request that an issuer hold the proceeds 
of a letter of credit on which a previous demand has been made 
does not constitute a withdrawal or revocation of the earlier 
demand. 
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If the issuer of a letter of credit claims the demand is 
nonconforming or defective it may not wait until the letter of 
credit has expired before it first gives the beneficiary notice 
of dishonor. If a letter of credit issuer claims that a demand 
made on a letter of credit is nonconforming, the issuer must 
immediately notify the beneficiary that the issuer has rejected 
the demand. The Bank failed to give Coyne any notice of dishonor 
and thereby Coyne was led to believe that its demand had been 
honored by the Bank. Also, and analogously, where an issuer 
believes a beneficiary demand on a letter of credit has been 
revoked or withdrawn, the issuer should be required to notify the 
beneficiary that the issuer regards the demand as having been 
withdrawn. The issuer may not lull the beneficiary into 
believing the demand on the letter is conforming, and then, 
without warning, belatedly claim the letter of credit has already 
expired. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AFFORD COYNE THE 
OPPORTUNITY FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AFTER COYNE HAD MADE A TIMELY 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT PURSUANT TO THE UTAH RULES OF 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. 
The District Court committed reversible error in not 
affording Coyne the opportunity for oral argument on its motion 
for summary judgment. Unless the District Court specifically 
found (and it did not so find) that Coyne's motion was frivolous 
or that prior Utah law had already decided the issues raised in 
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Coyne/s motion, that court was obliged to allow Coyne the right 
to have oral argument in favor of its, and against the Bank's, 
motion for summary judgment, 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT COYNE'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON COYNE'S TIMELY DEMAND ON THE 
LETTER OF CREDIT AND THE BANK'S FAILURE TO GIVE ANY NOTICE 
OF NONCOMPLIANCE. 
A. The May 24, 1995 Letter Was a Proper, Conforming Demand 
or Draw on the Letter of Credit, 
The Letter of Credit's language provides: 
We [the Bank] hereby establish our Irrevocable Letter 
of Credit in your [Coyne's] favor for the account of 
Stanley R. Pope . . . up to the aggregate amount of 
USD 33,000.00 available by your draft(s) drawn at sight 
on Zions First National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah 
accompanied by: State on Coyne Textile Service 
letternead purportedly signed by an officer of Coyne 
Textile Service that Stanley R. Pope has not fulfilled 
the term of contract relating to the lease of one 
Learjet 25-D aircraft stating the reason, . . . 
(emphasis in original) 
R-91-216; Addendum "A." 
The Letter of Credit required Coyne to submit no other 
documents in conjunction with any draw Coyne would make on the 
Letter of Credit. Id. 
On May 24, 1993, Coyne's Treasurer wrote the Bank on a 
document bearing Coyne's letterhead: 
This is to certify that Stanley R. Pope has not 
fulfilled the terms of the contract relating to the 
lease of one Learjet 25-D. Mr. Pope has defaulted in 
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the payment of rent and other amounts in excess of the 
face amount of the attached letter of credit. 
Please pay the entire amount of Thirty-Three Thousand 
($33,000.00) Dollars to our attorney, David P. O'Hara, 
at the following address: 
[address omitted] 
R-89, 103, 209; Addendum "B." 
It is undisputed that the Bank received the May 24, 
1993 demand on the Letter of Credit. R-106-107. It is also 
undisputed that the Bank never gave Coyne any written or other 
notice that the Letter of May 24, 1993 was in any way a 
defective, nonconforming or inadequate draw on the Letter of 
Credit. R-105-106. 
The May 24, 1993 Letter was proper in both form and 
content as a demand draw on the Letter of Credit. The Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code indicates that an instrument is a draft 
if it contains an order to pay. Utah Code, Section 70A-3-104(5). 
Although the specific issue does not appear to have been decided 
by an appellate court in Utah, cases involving letters of credit 
in other jurisdictions have held that a letter containing an 
order to pay satisfies the requirements for an enforceable sight 
draft under the UCC. 
In Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 3 94 F.Supp 352 
(D.C. Pa. 1975), rev'd on other grounds 550 F.2d 882 (3rd Cir. 
1977) one of the issues before the district court was whether a 
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request for payment under a letter of credit, could be a "sight 
draft." The federal district court in Pennsylvania held that a 
telex which made demand for payment met the requirement of a 
sight draft. The opinion observes: 
A sight draft is an order for the immediate payment of 
money from a bank. In the instant case, the telex in 
question contained a direction that money be 
transferred to Equibank,s account at the Chase Bank in 
New York. Equibank argues that this was not a demand 
and, therefore, the telex could not be considered a 
draft. However, Comment 2 to Section 3-102 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code states: '. . .In the case of 
orders the dividing line between 'a direction to pay' 
and 'an authorization or request' may not be self-
evident in the occasional, unusual, and therefore non-
commercial case. The prefixing of words of courtesy to 
the direction—as please pay' or 'kindly pay' should 
not lead to a holding that the direction has 
degenerated into a mere request. . . ' 
Upon examination of this particular transaction, 
. we conclude that the telex of April 30, 1973 
meets the requirements of a sight draft. Chase 
intended it to be a draft, and it was so treated by 
Equibank upon receipt. 
Chase Manhattan, supra 394 F.Supp. at 356. 
And in Temple Eastex Incorporated v. Addison Bank, 672 
S.W. 2d 793 (Tex. 1984), the Supreme Court of Texas held that 
where a bank had issued an irrevocable letter of credit that was 
to be honored upon the beneficiary's presentation of a sight 
draft and an affidavit of default, the letter of credit 
beneficiary complied by sending a demand letter on its stationary 
and the affidavit of default. The Texas court cited with 
16 
approval the Texas Appellate Court decision in Travis Bank & 
Trust v. State, 660 S.W. 2d 851 (Tex. App. 1983), which held that 
where a letter of credit did not define the term "draft," a 
beneficiary could make proper demand on the letter of credit by 
presenting a simple letter demanding payment. Temple Eastex 
supra, 672 S.W. 2d at 796-797 (citing Travis supra, 660 S.W.2d at 
854-855. In Temple Eastex the court concluded: 
We hold the demand for payment and accompanying 
documents sent to the bank constituted "drafts" as that 
term was contemplated by the parties and as that term 
is usually interpreted when used in letters of credit. 
Temple Eastex supra, 672 S.W.2d at 798. See also Titanium Metals 
Corporation of America v. Space Metals, Inc., 529 P.2d 431 (Utah 
1974)(case involving course of dealings excusing submission of 
draft under the circumstances of that case). 
In the case before this Court, the Letter of Credit did 
not define the term "sight draft." However, the Letter of May 
24, 1993 contained a clear demand for payment. That letter 
specifically referred to the Letter of Credit, gave the required 
notice of default in the form set out in the Letter of Credit. 
The demand for payment in the Letter of May 24, 1993 was for a 
sum certain. That letter was prepared, signed, submitted to and 
received by the Bank long before any expiry of the Letter of 
Credit. The Bank never objected to either the form, content or 
timing of the May 24, 1993 Letter. The Bank never gave notice 
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that demand was nonconforming or defective. R-105-106. Under the 
reasoning of Chase Manhattan and Temple Eastex that letter was 
effective as a sight draft made upon the Letter of Credit. 
B. AN INSTRUCTION TO HOLD PROCEEDS OF A LETTER OF CREDIT 
DOES NOT AND CANNOT REASONABLY BE CONSTRUED TO 
CONSTITUTE A REVOCATION, WITHDRAWAL OR CANCELLATION OF 
AN EARLIER DEMAND MADE ON THE LETTER OF CREDIT. 
In Coynes Letters of May 28, 1993 and June 1, 1993, it 
or its attorney simply advised the Bank to hold the proceeds of 
the Letter of Credit. R-77, 79, 101-102, 207, 214; Addenda "C" 
and "D." Nothing in either of those letters uses the words 
"revoke", "cancel", "rescind" or "withdraw." Each of those 
letters was written after the May 24 demand on the letter had 
already been written to and received by the Bank. R-254. The 
pivotal issue in this case is whether a request to "hold the 
proceeds" of a letter of credit, can or should operate to revoke 
or rescind the prior demand Coyne had made on that letter of 
credit. 
The term "proceeds" has a long standing, consistent 
commercial definition under both statutory and common law.2 
Slack's Law Dictionary (West ed. 1951), p. 1369, defines 
"proceeds" as: Issues; income; yield; receipts; produce; money or 
articles or other thing of value arising or obtained by the sale of 
property; the sum, amount, or value of property sold or converted 
into money or into other property, (citation omitted)(emphases 
added). 
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"Proceeds" is specifically defined in the Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code as follows: 
"Proceeds" includes whatever is received upon the sale, 
lease, exchange, collection or other disposition of 
collateral or proceeds. Insurance payable by reason of 
loss or damage to the collateral is proceeds, except to 
the extent that it is payable to a person other than a 
party to the security agreement. Money, checks, 
deposit accounts, and the like are "cash proceeds." 
All other proceeds are "noncash proceeds." 
Utah Code, Section 70A-9-306(l); See also, Insley Manufacturing 
Corporation v. Draper Bank and Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Utah 
1986). 
In the Tenth Circuit decision In re Hastie, 2 F.3d 1042 
(10th Cir. 1993), that court made the following observations with 
respect to the Uniform Commercial Code's definition of proceeds: 
fl[P]roceeds" are defined as "whatever is received 
upon the sale, exchange, collection or other 
disposition of the collateral or proceeds." (citing 9-
306(1) of the Code). With respect to this definition, 
the term "sale" may be defined generally as '[a] 
revenue transaction where goods or services are 
delivered to a customer in return for cash or a 
contractual obligation to pay. [The] [t]erm 
comprehends [a] transfer of property from one party to 
another for valuable recompense. Black's Law 
Dictionary, 5th ed. at 1200 (1979). Similarly, the 
term "exchange" may be defined as "[the] [a]ct of 
giving or taking one thing for another,' Id. at 505, 
and the term "collect" in the context of a debt or 
claim may be defined as 'payment or liquidation of it," 
Id. at 238. Lastly, the phrase "other disposition" may 
be defined generally as the [a]ct of disposing; [or] 
transferring to the care or possession of another; [or] 
[t]he parting with, alienation of, or giving up [of] 
property. Id. at 423. 
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Hastie supra, 2 F.3d at 1045. See also. In the Matter of Muncrer, 
495 F.2d 511, 513 (9th Cir. 1974), (. . .the word "proceeds" is 
to be given a flexible and broad content). 
Applying the language of Section 70A-9-306(l) of the 
Utah Uniform Commercial Code defining "proceeds" and the 
definitions in Hastie as to "exchanges,""collections," 
"transfers" and "other dispositions" of proceeds, the intangible 
contract rights Coyne had in the Letter of Credit became, 
proceeds generated by an exchange, collection, transfer, or other 
disposition, upon Coyne's May 24, 1993 demand to the Bank on the 
Letter of Credit. Coyne's demand fully complied with the 
specific terms and requirements set forth in the Letter of 
Credit. The Bank did not object to the form or content of the 
demand. Having made a timely and proper demand, Coyne had every 
reason to believe, first that its demand had been accepted, and 
second, that by exchange, transfer or other disposition, the 
Letter of Credit's $33,000.00 face amount had been reduced to 
proceeds. Such was certainly Coyne's understanding. R-171, 172, 
248. 
In addition to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code Section 
70A-9-306(1), that portion of the Code dealing specifically with 
letters of credit makes a clear distinction between drawing on a 
letter of credit and the right to the letter of credit's proceeds 
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after such proceeds have been generated. Section 70A-5-116(3) of 
the Utah Code provides: 
Except where the beneficiary has effectively assigned 
his right to draw or his right to proceeds nothing in 
this Section limits his rights to transfer or negotiate 
drafts of demands drawn under the credit, (emphasis 
added). 
The above cited section of the Utah Code recognizes 
that a draw or demand made on a letter of credit is a separate 
matter from the right to receive the letter of credit's proceeds. 
By distinguishing between draws and proceeds, Section 70A-5-
116(3) recognizes that a right to proceeds is not synonymous with 
a right to draw. And at least by implication, that section 
acknowledges that action taken with respect to a right to receive 
a letter of credit's proceeds is not the same as the right to 
draw on the letter. In light of Section 70A-5-116(3) it is 
difficult to understand how the Bank can possibly claim that a 
request to hold proceeds somehow operated as a revocation, 
withdrawal or rescission of the earlier demand made on the Letter 
of Credit itself. 
In light of the statutory and case law definitions of 
proceeds, the timing of Coyne's letters of May 28, 1993 and June 
1, 1993, which in very narrow terms simply instructed the Bank to 
hold the proceeds, the language of 70A-5-116(3) which draws 
distinction between a right to draw and a right to proceeds, and 
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the absence of any words of revocation, withdrawal or rescission 
in the Letters of May 28, 1993 and June 1# 19933, the only 
reasonable interpretation of the language in Coyne's letters to 
the Bank is that Coyne instructed the Bank to hold the proceeds 
of the Letter of Credit and not to revoke or withdraw the earlier 
demand made on the credit itself. 
C. BY FAILING TO GIVE COYNE NOTICE OF ANY PROBLEM WITH ITS 
DEMAND ON THE LETTER OF CREDIT UNTIL AFTER THAT LETTER 
HAD ALLEGEDLY EXPIRED, THE BANK IS NOW ESTOPPED FROM 
CLAIMING EXPIRY. 
Since Coyne made a proper and timely demand on the 
Letter of Credit, and since the Letters of May 28 and June 1, 
1993 did not revoke or withdraw the earlier demand, the district 
court erred in holding that the Letter of Credit expired before 
Coyne made its demand on the Letter of Credit. In addition, 
under the facts of this case, the Bank's failure to timely notify 
Coyne that its demand was nonconforming or that the Bank believed 
that Coyne's demand had been withdrawn, estops the Bank from now 
raising the expiry issue. By failing to give Coyne any notice 
whatever until after the Bank claimed the Letter of Credit had 
expired, the Bank lulled Coyne into thinking that Coyne's demand 
3The Letter of May 28, 1993 was written by Coyne's lawyer, to 
whom the word "proceeds" would have a definite legal meaning. Had 
he intended to cancel the demand, the term "hold the proceeds" 
would be an odd nomenclature for an attorney. Had he wanted to 
cancel, withdraw or rescind the letter, words using those terms 
would have more clearly announced that purpose. 
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on the letter had been accepted and that the Bank was holding the 
proceeds of the letter according to Coyne,s request. R-105, 248. 
Cases which have decided analogous issues have estopped banks 
from raising defenses which were asserted for the first time at 
or after the expiry date of the applicable letter of credit. 
In Crocker Commercial Services, Inc. v. Countryside 
Bank, 538 F.Supp. 1360 (D.C. 111. 1981), a beneficiary of a 
letter of credit sued the issuing bank for wrongful dishonor of a 
demand made upon a letter of credit. The bank waited until after 
the letter of credit had already expired before informing the 
beneficiary that the documents in its demand were nonconforming. 
The federal district court granted the beneficiary/s motion for 
summary judgment, noting: 
Bank's conduct may fairly be viewed as creating 
either a waiver or estoppel, for it stood by silently 
and permitted the Letter of Credit to run out, even 
though an identification of the claimed deficiencies 
would have enabled Crocker to cure them. 
* * * 
For that reason the failure to make timely objection is 
a waiver of any curable flaws in the beneficiary's 
demand. Had Bank voiced its objections to Crocker at 
any time through January 20 [the expiry date], Crocker 
could have cured the hypertechnical language 
difficulties now relied upon by Bank. 
Crocker supra. 538 F.Supp. at 1363. 
In Marino Industries v. Chase Manhattan Bank. N.A., 686 
F.2d 112 (2d Cir 1982), the beneficiary sued the bank on several 
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letter of credit transactions. With respect to one of those 
transactions it appeared that certificates of inspection were to 
be submitted as part of the demand on the letter. The 
beneficiary submitted the certificates before the letter of 
credit expired, but the bank waited until after the expiration 
date before returning the certificates. The Circuit Court wrote: 
A further problem with respect to the certificates of 
inspection is presented by the fact that Chase waited a 
month-and-a-half before returning them to Marino for 
correction. Under article 8(d) of the Uniform Customs 
& Practice for Documentary Credits, Chase had "a 
reasonable time" within which to examine the 
documentation [citation omitted]. If Chase had 
returned the certificates promptly, Marino would have 
had ample time to correct any deficiencies. By not 
returning the certificates until after the letter had 
expired, Chase made it impossible for Marino to correct 
any deficiencies and still make timely presentation 
[citations omitted]. 
Marino Industries supra, 686 F.2d at 118. 
l n Integrated Measurement Systems, Inc. v. 
International Commercial Bank of China, 757 F.Supp. 938 (D. 111. 
1991), the federal district court granted summary judgment 
against a beneficiary on letters of credit. The letter of credit 
required presentation of certain documents before the letter 
would be honored. The letter was subject to the UCP. Nearly 
three weeks before the expiry of the letter, the beneficiary 
submitted its documents. The bank waited until after the letter 
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had expired before returning the documents for alleged 
noncompliance. The court decided against the banks, holding: 
Under UCP Art. 16 Banks are estopped from arguing 
nonconformity by reason of the failure to give 
Integrated Measurement timely notice of the defects. 
International Bank received Integrated Measurement's 
documents on March 10 and did not notify Integrated 
Measurement of its objections until March 30—fully 20 
days later and, indeed, five days after the credit had 
expired, so that Integrated Measurement was precluded 
from curing the defect. 
Integrated Measurement supra, 757 at 947 (emphasis in original). 
In the instant case, the Bank never informed Coyne that 
the Bank claimed Coyne's May 24, 1993 demand on the Letter of 
Credit was nonconforming or defective. The Bank never informed 
Coyne that it would not hold the proceeds of the Letter of Credit 
as requested in the May 28 and June 1, 1993 Letters. The Bank 
allowed the expiry date on the Letter of Credit to pass without 
giving Coyne any written or other response to either the demand 
or the requests to hold the proceeds. R-105-106, 248-249. 
In Crocker, Marino and Integrated Measurement the 
courts held that a bank's belated responses to the beneficiary, 
given only after the letters of credit had expired, were 
ineffective and estopped the bank from claiming defects or 
nonconformance with respect to the demand on the letter of 
credit. But in those cases at least a response was given. Prior 
to the time it filed suit, Coyne never received any information 
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nor was it given any indication that its demand on the letter had 
not been accepted nor that the Bank had not honored the request 
to hold the proceeds. R-248-249. See also R-105-106. 
The Bank's failure to give timely notice to Coyne that 
the demand was ineffective or that the Bank would not hold the 
proceeds of the Letter of Credit greatly prejudiced Coyne. In 
the absence of notice from the Bank that the Bank was not holding 
the proceeds, Coyne was lulled into the reasonable belief that 
there was no need to do anything further with respect to the 
Letter of Credit until after the arbitration matter was 
terminated. The Bank waited until months after the expiry date 
and indeed after suit was filed before revealing to Coyne that it 
had not held the proceeds as requested by Coyne. R-248-249. Even 
after the October 25, 1993 Letter, the Bank still never gave 
Coyne timely notice that it would not honor the Letter of Credit. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE UCP ESTOP THE BANK FROM FAILING TO 
HONOR THE LETTER OF CREDIT. 
The Letter of Credit provided it was governed by the 
terms of the UCP then in effect. R-91, 216. Addendum "A." As 
quoted above, Article 16 of the UCP which governed the Letter of 
Credit requires an issuing bank that intends to refuse documents 
submitted with a demand, as not conforming, to give the presentor 
or beneficiary "notice to that effect without delay" of the 
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dishonor. UCP 16(d). The notice must contain a description of 
the alleged discrepancies and inform the appropriate party that 
the bank will hold the documents at the disposal of the presentor 
or return the documents. Id. If the bank fails to do so, it is 
precluded from claiming nonconformance of the documents. UCP 
16(e). In the case before this Court, the Bank did nothing. 
Cases which have arisen under the UCP have held that 
where the issuing bank fails to promptly object to alleged 
nonconforming demands on a letter of credit, the bank is estopped 
from raising the defense of nonconformance. In Kerr-McGee 
Chemical Corporation v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
872 F.2d 971 (11th Cir. 1989), the beneficiary of a letter of 
credit sued the successor of an issuing bank. The bank had 
failed to timely specify alleged defects in the documents 
presented when demand was made. As in the case here, the letter 
of credit in Kerr-McGee provided it was subject to the 1983 
revision of the UCP. Kerr-McGee supra, 872 F.2d at 973. The 
Eleventh Circuit held that since the credit was governed by the 
UCP, the issuing bank's failure to allege and identify the 
supposed defects in the demand on the letter of credit estopped 
the bank from later relying on such defects as grounds for 
avoiding payment. In the course of the opinion the court held: 
We think this provision [UCP Article 16(e)] makes 
plain that a bank will be estopped from subsequent 
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reliance on a ground for dishonor if it did not specify 
that ground in its initial dishonor. 
Id. 
Later in the opinion the court noted: 
The 1983 UCP provides that the bank must state its 
reason for dishonor, and that failure to state these 
reasons will preclude a later claim of discrepancy. 
UCP Art. 16e. It is true that courts have varying 
approaches to the application of estoppel to letter of 
credit transactions. This fact is not relevant, 
however where the parties have explicitly incorporated 
the 1983 UCP in the letter of credit. 
Kerr-McGee supra, 872 F.2d at 974. 
In Bank of Cochin, Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust 
Co., 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986), an issuing bank brought suit 
against a confirming bank for wrongful dishonor of a letter of 
credit. The Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of 
the confirming bank on grounds that the issuing bank gave 
untimely notice of document noncompliance. The letter of credit 
was governed by the then applicable version of the UCP. After 
considering what it deemed to be the relevant issues in the 
matter the court concluded: 
We hold, therefore, that Cochin's delay in specifying 
the defects estopped it from asserting that the 
documents did not comply with the letter of credit, and 
that Cochin's two-week delay in notifying MHT [the 
confirming bank] of its intent to return the documents 
precludes this suit. 
Bank of Cochin, 808 F.2d at 213. See alsof Marino Industries, 
686 F.2d at 118. 
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Applying the rationale of the Kerr-McGee and Bank of 
Cochin cases, each of which involved letters of credit which were 
governed by the provisions of the UCP, to the case now before 
this Court, the Bank's failure to give Coyne any notice, let 
alone timely notice, that the demand on the Letter of Credit was 
nonconforming or that the Bank would not hold the proceeds of 
that credit contractually estops the Bank from raising any 
alleged defect or deficiency in the demand, the Letters of May 
28, and June 1, 1993 and/or the Letter of October 25, 1993. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW COYNE'S 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT ON ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
As cited earlier, Rule 4-501(3)(b) of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration provides that where the granting of a 
motion would dispose of all or part of an action, either party 
may file a written request for hearing. That motion for oral 
argument is to be made at the time of filing a party7s principal 
memorandum. Id. Subpart (c) of Rule 4-501(3) provides that the 
request for oral argument shall be granted unless the underlying 
motion is either frivolous or unless the dispositive issues 
relevant to the motion have previously been authoritatively 
decided. 
In the instant case, Coyne filed its request for oral 
argument at the time of its original motion for summary judgment. 
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R-97-98. The district court's memorandum decision and its formal 
order granting the Bank's motion for summary judgment and denying 
Coyne's motion for summary judgment and request for oral argument 
simply denied the request for oral argument. R-279-2814. The 
district court entered no finding that Coyne's motion for summary 
judgment was frivolous. Id. See also. Addendum "F" and Addendum 
"G". Neither did the district court cite any prior controlling 
or authoritative decision which was adverse to the positions 
urged by Coyne. Id. Insofar as Coyne has been able to determine, 
the issues raised in this appeal are matters of first impression 
for a Utah court. 
Coyne has found no Utah case authority interpreting the 
language or scope of Rule 4-501(3)(b)-(c). However, from the 
statute's plain language the right to oral argument appears 
mandatory unless the court finds the motion is frivolous or 
resolved by prior controlling authority. Subsection (c) states: 
Such request [for oral argument] shall be granted 
unless the court finds that (a) the motion or 
opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the 
dispositive issue or set of issues governing ;the 
granting or denial of the motion has been 
authoritatively decided, (emphasis supplied). 
4The entire memorandum decision and order granting defendant's 
motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment and request for oral argument are included as 
Addendum "F" and Addendum "G" respectively. 
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In a sister state decision State ex rel. Frohnmaver v. 
Bicar, Inc. 850 P.2d 1163 (Ore App. 1993) the defendant moved to 
dismiss plaintiffs complaint. In conjunction with that motion 
defendant requested oral argument. The trial court denied both 
the motion and the request for oral argument. The Oregon Uniform 
Trial Court Rules 5.050(1) provide in part: "There shall be oral 
argument if requested by the moving party in the caption of the 
motion or by a responding party in the caption of a response." 
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the trial court decision and 
remanded the case, holding that the Oregon rule requiring oral 
argument was mandatory. In the course of the opinion the Oregon 
court observed: 
Oral argument offers the parties an important 
opportunity to clarify arguments and to respond to the 
judge's questions about the record and the legal issues 
that the judge deems critical. Oral argument promotes 
an understanding of the dispute that written 
communication does not always duplicate. As this court 
can confirm, oral argument can induce the judge to 
consider or to change preliminary conclusions reached 
after a review of written briefs. It also serves to 
assure the public that the judge has considered the 
case and is accountable for the decision. Defendants' 
opportunity to appeal and seek reversal of legal errors 
does not eliminate the prejudicial effect of the denial 
of the opportunity for an optimal decision-making 
process in the trial court. The court's refusal to 
allow oral argument, as required by the UTCR 5.050(1), 
was reversible error. 
Bicar supra, 850 P.2d at 1165. 
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Similarly, in the Hawaii Supreme Court decision in 
Jensen v. Pratt, 491 P.2d 547 (Hawaii 1971) the trial court 
entered summary judgment without affording opportunity for oral 
argument to the party against whom the motion was granted. On 
appeal the state supreme court held that the failure to grant 
oral argument, contrary to the state rule affecting summary 
judgment, so strongly affected a party's right as to constitute 
harmful error per se. 
In reversing the trial court decision the appellate 
court wrote: 
We have neither a rule nor an order generally 
dispensing with the requirement of oral hearings on 
motions for summary judgment. Accordingly, we think 
that the failure of the trial court to give the parties 
an opportunity to be heard orally as required by 
H.R.C.P. Rule 56(c) was reversible error. 
Jensen supra. 491 P.2d at 548.4 
4In a federal court decision interpreting the scope of Rule 
56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the Ninth Circuit 
wrote: 
[I]n view of the language of Rule 56(c) , and having 
in mind that the granting of such a motion disposes of 
the action on the merits, with prejudice, a district 
court may not, by rule or otherwise, preclude a party 
from requesting oral argument, nor deny such a request 
when made by a party opposing the motion unless the 
motion for summary judgment is denied (citation omitted) 
Dredge Corporation v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1964). 
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Coyne respectfully urges that the reasoning of the 
Oregon appellate court in Bicar is particularly pertinent here. 
Both the Utah and the Oregon statutes speak in terms of mandatory 
rights to oral argument if the request for such argument has been 
timely raised. The district court should have granted Coyne's 
motion for oral argument and committed reversible error in not 
affording Coyne the opportunity for that oral argument. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court erred in granting the Bank's motion 
for summary judgment. It also erred in failing to grant Coyne's 
motion for summary judgment. Coyne made a proper, timely demand 
on the Letter of Credit. That demand was never revoked or 
withdrawn. In any event, the Bank failed to give timely notice 
of any rejection of Coyne's demand on the Letter of Credit as 
required by its contractual adoption of the Uniform Customs and 
Practice for Documentary Credits (1983 Revision). Bank also 
failed to give timely notice that it had failed to comply with 
Coyne's request that the Bank hold the proceeds of the Letter of 
Credit. The District Court erred in failing to grant Coyne's 
motion for summary judgment on these bases. 
It was also reversible error for the trial court not to 
allow Coyne the opportunity for oral argument after Coyne had 
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made timely request for such oral argument consistent with the 
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. 
Appellant Coyne requests the Court to reverse the ruling of 
the District Court, remand this case, and order that judgment be 
entered in favor of Appellant Coyne. 
DATED this 2P^ day of December, 1995. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
rtorneys for the Plaintiff 
ind Appellant, 
Coyne International 
Enterprises Corp. d/b/a/ Coyne 
Textile Services 
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Tab A 
ZIONS 
FIRfeT NATIONAL BANK 
ESTABLISHED 1873 
IRREVOCABLE LETTER OF CREDIT 
COYNE TEXTILE SERVICE 
140 COURTLAND AVENUE. 
SYRACUSE, NEW YORK 13221. 
~I 
INTF JATTONAL BANKING DEPARTMENT 
P.O. Box 30709 
Salt Laic City, Utah 84130 U.SJL 
Telephone: 801/524-4916 
Telex: 3789475 Answerback: INTBKZIONS SLC 
Swift Code: ZFNBUS55 
DATE: JUNE 2 3 , 1992 
LETTER OF CREDIT NO.: N? 005248 
L J 
Gentlemen: 
We hereby establish our Irrevocable Letter of Creditin your favor for the account of 
STANLEY R. POPE, 582 SOUTH 450 EAST, OREM, UTAH 84058 
up to the aggregate amount of USD33 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
available by your draft(s) drawn at SIGHT 
on Zions First National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah accompanied by: 
STATEMENT ON COYNE TEXTILE SERVICE LETTERHEAD PURPORTEDLY SIGNED BY AN OFFICER OF 
COYNE TEXTILE SERVICE THAT STANLEY R. POPE HAS NOT FULFILLED THE TERM OF CONTRACT 
RELATING TO THE LEASE OF ONE LEAR JET 25-D AIRCRAFT STATING THE REASON. 
PARTIAL DRAWINGS ARE PERMITTED. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
We hereby agree with drawers, endorsers and bona fide holders that all drafts drawn under and in comp-
liance with the terms of this credit will be duly honored upon presentation and delivery of documentsas 
specified to the drawee if drawn and presented for negotiation on or before AUGUST 3 1 , 1 9 9 3 at our bank. 
The Amount and Date of Each Negotiation Must Be Endorsed on the Back Hereof by xr-—. TV*i?<t* V A «t~ . 
the Negotiating Bank. V e r y T*U.y X©UTfr 
— — . L - 'TT„.r„.,m PiKfnrrn and Practice for Documentary Credits T. X./J 
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COYNE TEXTILE SERVICES 
J-XECUUVr. Of^iCH 
PQ. Bo* 4t*Cr4 
140 COfli^ u J Avu-u 
Syracuse New Str 
(315)47S-)b26 
BALTIMOHt. MD 
6ANG0H, Mf 
B£CKU;t, WV 
BETSY WAYNE, KY 
BMiSTOL. IN 
BUFFALO. N> 
BURLlNOlON, VI 
CHArtLfcijlON. WV 
CLfcVE-LANU. Ort 
r " . »'A 
•..__,MONT. v*v 
HAZLCTOW. PA 
HUNTINGTON, WV 
JOUET. il 
LONDON, KY 
LONG i&>.*HlK NY 
NEWAhiV NJ 
N£WBfcDI:0*D -
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PITTSBUHGH. PA 
6CHENl-CrAUv f 
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YORK. r*A 
2ions First National Bank 
International Banking Department 
P.O. Box 30709 
Salt Lake City, 
Att Ralph Nelson 
Re: Letter of credit 
Number 005248 
This is to certify.that Stanley R. pope has no t 
fulfilled the term of the contract relating to the lease 
of one Learjet 25-D* Mr. Pope has defaulted in the 
payment of rent and other amounts in excess of the fi 
amount of the attached letter of credit. 
please pay the entire amount of Thirty-Three 
Thousand ($33,00.0*00) Dollars to our attorney- navid P. 
O'w^ra, at the following address: 
O'Hara & Hanlon 
David p. O'Hara 
9 Albany Street 
Cazenovia, New York 13035 
Very truly yours, 
Coyne Textile Services 
i\X< .,1 <»v\^ 
By: 
Raymond T. Ryan 
An Officer (Treasurer) 
DPO/Lh 
Enclosure 
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David P. O'H&ra 
Kerry J. Henlon 
Peter W. Knych 
Atexaiidor Pobedinsky 
Of Coiinaol: 
Robert G. Rite 
OHara&Hanlon 
Attorneys at Law 
9 Albany Street 
Cazenovia, Now York 13035 
315-^58-8000 
Counsel: 
Peter W. Mitchell 
Syracuse Office 
One Park Place 
Syracu&e, New York 13,20 
315-422-5177 
Zions First National Ba:-,-
International Banking ~ 
P.O. Box 30709 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 1 30 
IHClSUil 
Re; Letter of Credit 
dumber 005248 
Dear Mr. Nelson: 
Textile Services . L 
tn vnu a de~"V~4 
,sneral counsel t : C : yne 
. Raymond T. Ryan of CTS has forwarded 
-referenced ^ett^r of credit. 
a s I indicated in my May 25, xer to Mr. Pope, he 
has a right to object to the CTS demand on the letter of credit* 
His objections are to be resolved by arbitration in Onondaga 
County, New York and I am proceeding to schedule that arbitration• 
As a result of Mr, Pope's objections, I an writing to 
-^ ^ou that the'proceeds of "the letter of credit are not to be 
paid as directed in Mr. Ryan's demand of May 25, 1993 and that you 
should hold the proceeds until you receive further instructions 
from this office 
i n i in in in in in 1 1 1 II ii« l I in mi i l l il il I i r i i i ' t 'hrni i i i i i n q f r o m Mr u 
/ V e i y I j 11 111 in in I11Vi 
O'Hara & jfanlon 
(/ 
DPO/sm 
c c : Mar' r . Robinsow, 
VL:: 
*' y * f »4—» 
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ENTERPRISES CORP COYNE TEXTILE SERVICES 
gxeCUTIVEO-
rO. Box 4854 
140 Cortland Avenue 
Syracuse, New Vbrk 13271 
(315)475-1626 
BALTIMORE. MO 
BECKLtY, WV 
HfcTSY LAYN'E K\ 
BRISTOL TN 
DurrAi o NY 
BURLWG1 ON, V I 
CHARLESTON. W J' 
CLEVhLAND, OH 
1 >VJ HOIS, PA 
fRiE. PA 
FAIRMONT, WV 
HAZLETON, PA 
HUNTINGTON. VW 
JOLIET, It 
iEWISTON. MI-
LONDON, KY 
LONG ISLAND, NY 
NEWARK. NJ 
NEW BfiOf-ORD. K 
PHILADELPHIA, P 
PITT50UHGH, PA 
RICHMOND, VA 
SCHENECTADY, Ml' 
SEAFOrttJ, DE 
SMITHBORO, NY 
SYRACUSE. NY 
TOLEDO, OH 
WA1FRBURY. CI 
WINCHrSTER, W 
WORCESTtH, m 
YOHK, PA 
June 1, 1993 
Zions First National Bank 
International Banking Department 
P.O. Box 30709 
Salt Lake Citv. 0 
Attn: Ralph G. Neis -
RE: Letter ci
 w ^ -»..-
Number 005248 
As is set forth in Mr. O'Harars letter of May 28, 1993, you 
are authorized to hold the proceeds of the above referenced 
letter of credit until you receive further instructions from 
Mr. O'Hara. 
Very trui y ] MHIF M, 
1 > A W ^ 
Raymond T. Ryan 
Chief Financial Officer 
RTR:jmr 
TabE 
O'Hara &Hanlon 
Attorneys at Law 
David P. O'Hara < • ie Park Place Counsel: 
Kerry J. Hanlon Syracuse, New York 13202 Peter W. Mitchell 
Peter W. Knych 315-422-5177 Cazenovia Office 
Alexander Pobedinsky 9 Albany Street 
Cazenovia, New York 13035 
Of Counsel: 315-655-9061 
Robert G. Ritz 
• October ,!bf IMMJ 
Via Certified Mail 
Return Receipt Requested 
Zions First National Bank 
International Banking Department 
P.O. Box 30709 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8413 0 
Re: Letter of Credit No. 005248 
Dea-* : 
This firm is general counsel to Coyne Textile Service 
("CTS") the beneficiary of the above-referenced letter of cred: 
As you may know, Mr. Raymond T. Ryan of CTS made a proper ~ 
nely demand on the letter of credit on May 24, 1993. However, as 
xs set forth in my letter to the bank dated May 28, 1993, and Mr. 
Ryan's letter dated June 1, 1993, copies of which are enclosed, CTS 
authorized you to hold the-proceeds of the letter of credit until 
you received further instructions from this office, Th I s letter 
shall constitute such further instructions. 
Because the pending arbitration referenced in my May 28, 1993 
letter has been resolved in CTS1 favor as evidenced by the enclosed 
copy of the arbitration award, we are now instructing you to 
forward the entire proceeds of the letter of credit i n the amc-
of $33,000.00 to the following office: 
Ha lira & Hanlon 
uavid P. O'Hara, Esq. 
9 Albany Street 
Cazenovia, New Yor« 
Please be advised that w«* _.._ ".^ jrizeci ^ w.o 
initiate litigation against the bank in t: _.:at the proceeds 
are withheld. 
Mr. Dale Marcotte 
October 25, 1993 
Page 2 
At the request of your legal counsel, William G. Marsden, we 
are copying him with this letter, including enclosures. 
Thank you for your anticipated cooperation in this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
O'HARA & HANLON 
David P. O'Hara 
DPO/sb 
Enclosures 
cc: William G. Marsden, Esq. 
TabF 
C/, 
o. ©rA 
IN HIE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CX 
UTAH COUNTY, ST4TF O F UTAH 
COYNE INTERNATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES CORP., d/b/-~ 
TEXTILE SERVICES, 
a New York Corporation, 
'NE 
vs. 
tJAJNK, 
Defen 
. . . . . - O K * v n f . M DECISION 
i \<. \ D O3Q400620 
He ,1 * \N* M »* - . 
aunt Oabanilla 
DEPIT\ •. t L-RK Georgia Snyder 
EXTERN Andrew Pickering 
Morion lary Judgment an*, t n .;. ;t o Motion t.-i Summary Judgment and Request for Oiv 
Argument. Having received and considered Defendant's and Plaintiffs Motions, together with 
memoranda in support, in opposition, and in reply to the motions, the Court hereby grants the 
Defendant's motion and denies the Plaintiffs motion. The Coin t finds that although the parties 
disagree on the interpretation of certain facts, that there are no matei ial facts at issue 
regarding eiflin I Mi ml ml i ll'l.tintiff* motions for si immai } ji idgment and therefore i ule s as a 
matter of law. 
On May 24, 1993, Plaintiff had requested a draw on a Letter of Credit which had been issued 
by Defendant on June 23, 1992 Thee, in letters dated May 28, 1993, and, June 1, 1993, Plaintiff 
instructed Defendant to hold the proceeds until Defendant received further instructions Once 
arbitration was resolved in Plaintiffs fa*.o; Plaintiff AKIUM de. ' " . . ' - . . * » , , 
b ';" T • - f • - -:mg th.r f i «^tte* * ! tjdn naj 
its own terms. 
Plaintiff argues that the language in. the May 28th and June 1st letters, asking Defendant to 
"hold the proceeds" ui itil Defendai it received further instructions, merely asked that the proceeds 
4/>fci 
of the draw on the Letter of Credit be held in trust for Plaintiff, pending arbitration with the 
beneficiary of the Letter of Credit, and that the letters did not withdraw Plaintiffs request for 
draw on the Letter of Credit. 
Defendant argues that the letters dated May 28, 1993, and June 1, 1993, sent by Plaintiffs 
attorney and Plaintiff, respectively, withdrew Plaintiffs request for payment made in a letter 
dated May 24, 1993. The Letter of Credit expired on August 31, 1993, and thereby rendered no 
obligation to pay Plaintiff pursuant to its request for payment in a letter dated October 25, 1993. 
The Court finds that, "[t]he basic rule applicable to letters of credit is that the 
obligation set forth therein must be strictly construed and performed precisely in accordance with 
its terms." NewVector Communications v. Union Bank, 663 F. Supp. 253, 255 (D. Utah 1987). A 
crucial term of the Letter of Credit is the date of expiration. 
Plaintiff attempts to impose a duty on Defendant to hold those proceeds for Plaintiff in 
some kind of trust or escrow, a duty which Defendant never contracted to perform, and which the 
Court finds should not be imposed. The Letter of Credit dictated that it expired on August 31, 
1993, ending Defendant's obligation to pay. Construing Plaintiffs letters as requests for putting 
the proceeds of the Letter of Credit in trust circumvents Plaintiffs obligation to either demand 
payment before the expiration of the Letter of Credit or request an extension or renewal thereof. 
The certainty of the terms of an Letter of Credit should be preserved. 
Therefore, the Court finds that the letters asking that the proceeds be held by Defendant 
for Plaintiff were a withdrawal of the request for payment and a confirmation of such. Further, the 
Court finds that Defendant's obligation to pay on the Letter of Credit expired on August 31, 1993, 
and Defendant had no duty to honor Plaintiffs request for payment dated October 25, 1993. 
Plaintiffs Request for Oral Argument is denied. 
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision consistent with 
the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to 
submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no effect until such order is 
signed by the Court. 
Dated this 30th day of May, 1995, 
cc: Jennie B. Huggins, Esq. 
Craig Carlile, Esq. 
*«*&&* 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)SS 
COUNTY OP UTAH ) 
», M-C undersigned, Clerk, 
Co*.^ of Utah Counw 
annexed and foregou 
District 
TabG 
'U i i C" 
William G. Marsden (#2087) 
Jennie B. Huggins (#5486) 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendant 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7700 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR 
; . U ^ M - I M A i : , vH 
COYNE INTERNATIONAL ENTERPRISES 
CORP, d/b/a COYNE TEXTILE SERVICES, 
a New York corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
/IONS F1RS1 NA11UNA1, liANk, 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
>^ > W-1UU620CN 
Jud^e Ray M. Harding 
1;.. nawng come before the Cour' -MM \T, I',CS to Submit for 
consideration of Defendanfs Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment ana Request . . ^ vrgument; the court having received and 
considered the Motions, together with memoranda in support, in opposition, and in - T ! V 
to the Motions; the court having determined that there are no genuine issues of maierial 
fact and th:;- *u: .'• termined -. r 
issued its Memorandum Decision, it is hereby 
00 
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be, and hereby 
is, granted. It is further 
ORDERED that the Complaint be, and hereby is, dismissed with prejudice and 
on the merits. It is further 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment be, and hereby is, 
denied. It is further 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs Request for Oral Argument be, and hereby is, 
denied. 
DATED this /*7 day of LtU**^. 1995. 
BY THEXafcJRT-"'" *' 
Approved as to form: 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
By: 
Craig Carlile 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)SS 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
. toe undersigned, C l ^ k V ^ P ^ ^ ^ D C t 
Coun o* Utah Countv Ul$\. « & ^ * o . '•*$£* 
annaxeo ana forego ogoA \'&*?>l*J$i ;&: 
' origrfial do\^ uff^ m oti ftte m > c 
Witness 
ay 01/ 
CARMA 
000 283 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 9 " ^ day of June, 1995, I served the 
foregoing proposed ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT by mailing a duplicate original thereof by first-class 
United States mail, postage pre-paid and addressed as follows: 
Craig Carlile 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
92 North University Avenue #210 
Provo, Utah 84601 
jbhp!559 
tf^UsUJyUJ " Q 
000 282 
